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the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one
exonerated in a prior suit upon the same facts by the same plaintiff.
7
All that is necessary to render a judgment effectual as a bar to
another action is that the cause of action be substantially the same,8
i. e., the material issues must be the same.9 The reason therefor
is that the rule of res adjudicatc does not rest wholly on the narrow
grounds of technical estoppel, nor on the presumption that a former
judgment was right and just, but rather on the ground that public
policy requires a limit to litigation.' 0 Thus, on both principle and
precedent, where a plaintiff has one cause of action based on alleged
issues (the negligence of the servant, the imputed negligence of the
master and his own freedom from contributory negligence) he shall
be bound by his election as evidenced in a prior suit.
A. S.
SALES-AcTION BY HUSBAND AGAINST VENDOR FOR BREAcH
OF WARRANTY MADE TO WIFE.-Plaintiff's wife bought from defen-
dant retailer, on her own account, a quantity of crab meat. The food
proved to be contaminated and she became ill from the consumption
thereof. Plaintiff brought action against the retailer for loss of con-
' See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127, 32 Sup. Ct.
641 (1911); Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N. Y. 228, 105 N. E. 423
(1914) (The unusual action of the jury in holding the defendant liable and
exonerating the driver caused the court to grant a new trial instead of dis-
missing the complaint) ; cf. Featherston v. President etc., 71 Hun 109, 111
24 N. Y. Supp. 603, 605 (1893): "A judgment in favor of the principal or
surety on a ground equally applicable to both should be accepted as conclusive
against the plaintiff's right of action."
The exception is not allowed in cases involving joint tort feasors where
the liability is joint and several. Russell v. McCall, 141 N. Y. 437, 36 N. E.
498 (1894) (Court held each of the several wrongdoers severally liable for
the full amount of the misappropriated funds); Jefson v. Int'l Ry. Co., 80
Misc. 247, 140 N. Y. Supp. 941 (1913) (A judgment against the plaintiff in a
prior suit was not held a bar to the action because the defendant was liable
jointly and severally).
"A. H. G. M. and M. Co. v. Andrews, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 93 (1887), aff'd,
120 N. Y. 58, 23 N. E. 987 (1890) ; 34 C. J. 1500, n. 32.9 Lorillard v. Clyde, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 409 (1882), aff'd, 99 N. Y. 196,
1 N. E. 614 (1885); cf. DeSollar v. Hanscome, 158 U. S. 216, 221, 15 Sup.
Ct. 816 (1894): "It is of the essence of estoppel by judgment that either it
appear on the face of the record or be shown by extrinsic evidence that the
precise question was raised and determined in the former suit."
'o See Eissing Chemical Co. v. People's National Bank of Brooklyn, 205
App. Div. 89, 91, 199 N. Y. Supp. 342 (2d Dept. 1923), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 532,
143 N. E. 731 (1923) ; Haverhill v. Int'l Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 523, 217
N. Y. Supp. 522 (4th Dept. 1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E. 905 (1927)
wherein the court states that a sound public policy demands that successive
trials of the same issues of fact shall not be allowed to a party, although he
selects different parties as defendants not technically privy to the preceding
judgment or the immediate controversy in which it was granted.
RECENT DECISIONS
sortium based upon the breach of warranty of fitness for use and
merchantable quality which the retailer impliedly made to the vendee
wife.1 The plaintiff husband, disclaiming at the trial any theory of
negligence as a basis of recovery, succeeded in the Trial Term and
in the Appellate Division.2  On appeal, held, reversed. Privity of
contract is essential to recovery in any action for breach of warranty.
Giminez v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., and Mitsui & Co., 264
N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934).
In cases of actions for breach of warranty, our courts have been
consistently rigid in requiring contractual relation as a basis for
suit.3 But the factual set-up of these cases differs from that of the
instant case in that the plaintiffs therein were either sub-vendees or
donees who were themselves injured. The close relationship of hus-
band and !wife has been held to overcome the defect of lack of
privity in some branches of the law of contracts. 4  Historically, the
action for breach of warranty originally sounded purely in tort.5
Likewise, the damages allowed the wife in her action against the
retailer were awarded on the theory of ,a wrong, as in other cases
where the omission to perfect a contract obligation was considered
to be tortious in nature by the court.6 Other jurisdictions have been
somewhat less strict in applying the rule requiring privity,7 and in
one ease it was entirely disregarded.8 The majority of jurisdictions,
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1911) §96, subds. 1, 2; Rothmiller v. Stein, 143
N. Y. 581, 38 N. E. 718 (1894); People v. Clair, 221 N. Y. 108, 116 N. E.
868 (1917); Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853 (1918); Rinaldi v.
Mohican Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1918) ; Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y.
344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388,
175 N. E. 105 (1931) ; Bernstein v. Queens County Jockey Club, 222 App. Div.
191, 225 N. Y. Supp. 449 (2d Dept. 1927).
' Giminez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. and Mitsui Co., 240 App.
Div. 238, 269 N. Y. Supp. 463 (2d Dept. 1934).
'Boardwell v. Collie, 45 N. Y. 494 (1871); Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235
N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923); J. Aron Co. v. Sills, 240 N. Y. 588, 148
N. E. 717 (1925); Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N. Y. 73, 161
N. E. 423 (1928); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, stepra note 1.
' Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109, 52 N. E. 724 (1899).
'1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 195, p. 373.
'Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874); Rich v. New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Co., 87 N. Y. 382 (1882), Wherein Finch, J., said:
"Between actions plainly ex contractu and those early ex delicto there exists
what has been termed a borderland where the lines of distinction are shadowy
and obscure and the-tort and the contract so approach each other and become
so nearly coincident as to make their practical separation somewhat difficult";
Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad Co., 178 N. Y. 347, 70 N. E. 857(1904); Bush v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 187 N. Y. 388, 80 N. E. 197
(1907); Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647
(1920); Bernstein v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra note 1.
I Davis v. Van Kamp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920);
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Catani v. Swift, 251
Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915); Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
877, 111 So. 305 (1927).
'Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, supra note 7. Here the recovery
was by a donee, the court holding that the warranty followed the title.
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however, insist on privity. 9 A recovery on the ground of negligence
would have been more difficult here 10 than in other states," and to
bring himself under the statute,' 2 plaintiff would have had to prove
that the deleterious substance had been added, 13 whereas it developed
after the can had been sealed. While not going so far as to invoke
so broad a third party beneficiary rule as in Lawrence v. Fox,1 4 it is
submitted that the close relationship of the plaintiff to the injured
party in the instant case might, without departing radically from
established legal precedent, or opening the door to extensive litigation,
form a basis of recovery.
J. R. O'D.
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS-LAwFUL HARM-RULE APPLIED TO
TRADE ASSOCIATION.-Plaintiff, a civil engineer, furnished, accord-
ing to submitted building plans and specifications, estimates of
iron and wire to metal fabricators of whom thirty-two are members
of a voluntary, unincorporated association. Plaintiff's service en-
abled smaller and irresponsible concerns to bid and this, the parties
appear to agree, was ruinous to the trade. The association adopted
a resolution requiring its members to make their own estimates on
bids for metal work used in construction and enforced it by censure,
fines and expulsion. From an award of the Supreme Court granting
plaintiff damages and injunctive relief both sides appeal, held, re-
versed and complaint dismissed. The association acting in good
faith for the benefit and advantage of its members and in the best
interests of the trade was within its rights although plaintiff's busi-
ness was damaged by the resolution and its enforcement. Arnold v.
Burgess, 241 App. Div. 364, 272 N. Y. Supp. 534 (lst Dept. 1934).
Persons affiliating themselves with a voluntary association thereby
agree to abide by its constitution and by-laws since the latter are the
terms of the contract which define the privileges secured and the
duties assumed by those who become members.' At common law
'1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 244, n. 47.
"WHITNEY, LAW OF SALES (2d ed. 1934) §175, p. 201. In Sheppard v.
Beck Bros., Inc., 131 Misc. 164, 225 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1927) it was held that
the mere presence of a tack in the food did not give rise to a res ipsa loquitur
case.
'Cases cited in supra note 7, in which the court said that an implied
warranty ran to the sub-vendee to establish a duty, the breach of which
afforded a cause of action.
"N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARxETS LAW (1925) c. 612, subd. 8.
"Instant case.
"20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
'Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); see Rankin v.
Probey, 131 App. Div. 328, 331, 115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3d Dept. 1909):
